In many European countries, population aging had led to debate about a switch from conventional unfunded public pension systems to notional systems characterized by individual accounts. In this article, we develop an overlapping generations model in which endogenous growth is based on an accumulation of knowledge driven by the proportion of skilled workers and by the time they have spent in training. In such a framework, we show that conventional pension systems, contrary to notional systems, can enhance economic growth by linking bene…ts only to the partial earnings history. Thus, to ensure economic growth, the optimal adjustment to increased longevity could consist in increasing the size of existing retirement systems rather than switching to notional systems.
Introduction
In 1950, life expectancy at birth in Western Europe was 68 years. It is now 80 years and should reach 85 by 2050 (United Nations, 2009). The downside of this trend is the serious threat that is hanging over the …nancing of our public retirement systems. Financed on a PAYG basis, i.e. pension bene…ts are paid through contributions of contemporary workers, the systems must cope with an increasingly large number of pensioners compared to the number of contributors. With an unchanged average age of retirement, in France, for example, the ratio of pensioners to workers (the dependency ratio) should reach 70.1% in 2040, whereas it was 35.8% in 1990. Changes are unavoidable.
If we want to guarantee in the near future the current level of bene…ts within the same system, it will be necessary to increase either the contribution rate or the length of contribution (by delaying the age of retirement).
This …nancing problem calls into question the role of PAYG retirement systems in our societies. For instance, by evaluating the real pre-tax return on non-…nancial corporate capital at 9.3% 1 and the growth rate over the same period (1960 to 1995) at 2.6%, Feldstein (1995a Feldstein ( , 1995b Feldstein ( , 1996 unequivocally advocates the privatization of retirement systems and a switch to fully funded systems. He assesses the potential present-value gain at nearly $20 trillion for the United States. However, replacing conventional PAYG systems by …nancial -or funded -de…ned contribution (FDC) systems would certainly involve prohibitive social and political costs. One generation will have to pay twice. Implementing such a reform in Western democracies thus appears di¢ cult. For that reason, in recent years a large focus has been put on non-…nancial -or notional -de…ned contribution (NDC) systems as legislated in Sweden in 1994. As described by Palmer (2006) , NDC systems are PAYG systems that mimic FDC systems. Individual contributions are noted on individual accounts. Accounts are credited with a rate of return that re ‡ects demographic and productivity changes. Obviously, replacing conventional PAYG systems by NDC systems does not address the main concern of Feldstein (1995a Feldstein ( , 1995b Feldstein ( , 1996 , that is, the low return associated with the PAYG …nancing method. However, supporters of NDC systems claim that conventional systems, by linking pension bene…ts only partially to contributions, distort individual behaviors, inducing reduced work e¤orts or earlier retirements. In addition, they claim that only an explicit de…ned contribution system will be able to stabilize contributions in spite of aging populations.
However, looking at the empirical facts, the supposed ine¢ ciency of conventional retirement systems must be reconsidered. Firstly, even if their pension bene…ts are linked to partial earnings history, conventional systems are close to actuarial fairness 2 as NDC systems because high-income earners live longer Paxton, 1998, 1999; Breyer and Hupfeld, 2009 ) and have steeper age-earnings pro…les (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003; Bozio and Piketty, 2008) . Secondly, stabilizing contributions can be achieved similarly within the scope of more conventional de…ned bene…t systems, as seen in the "point system" in France or in Germany. In that case, the unit of pension rights is earnings points (not euros) and can be adjusted according to demographic and productivity changes, as in an NDC system. As stressed by Börsch-Supan (2006), cleverly designed conventional retirement systems can often do the same job as NDC systems. Finally, empirical …ndings from Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Zhang and Zhang (2004) tend to support a positive impact of retirement systems on economic growth through the human capital channel. From these perspectives, it is then not straightforward to determine whether the introduction of individual accounts or the stabilization of contributions are desirable objectives. In this article, we investigate whether the introduction of individual accounts into social security may be a desirable reform, starting from the fact that conventional retirement systems yield more economic growth.
To explain the positive link between PAYG retirement systems and economic growth that is suggested by the empirical …ndings, the theoretical literature has focused on the human capital channel, and particularly on parental altruism 3 . According to this strand of the literature, PAYG retirement systems result in higher economic growth because they provide an incentive for altruistic parents to invest more in their children's education.
However, as highlighted by Cigno (2010) , they also provide an incentive for parents to have fewer children, while the investment per child stays insu¢ -cient to be socially optimal. In that context, when private behaviour is not Cigno (2010) suggests that unconventional children-related pension systems be added to conventional retirement systems so as to allow individuals to earn a pension by raising children and by investing in their human capital.
While introducing such an unconventional system could stimulate both fertility and economic growth, Fanti and Gori (2013) nevertheless stress the associated risk of increasing cyclical instability.
Besides the impact of PAYG systems on parents'behavior, Kemnitz and corresponds to a decrease of the proportion of individuals who decide to train themselves with a …xed training length. By embedding both e¤ects, Le Garrec (2012) then shows that the positive e¤ect always dominates the negative one, at least for low contribution rates. In the spirit of Cigno (2010), the …ndings of Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) and Le Garrec (2001 suggest that an optimal feature of retirement systems would also consist in subsidizing people who invest in their own education by linking bene…ts to the best or last years, and not to full lifetime average earnings, as in NDC systems.
In this article, to analyze the relevancy of the switch from conventional unfunded public pension systems to notional systems we extend the so-cial security-growth literature in two directions. First, following Le Garrec (2012), we consider investment in human capital through both the proportion of individuals who decide to invest and the time they invest. However, by not specifying a particular distribution of learning abilities, we can provide explicit and general conditions so that the positive e¤ect associated with the lengthening of training may be dominated by the negative e¤ect, i.e. the decrease of the proportion of educated individuals. We then show that economic growth may exhibit an inverse U-shaped pattern with respect to the size of an actuarially fair retirement system whose pensions are linked to the best or last years, while an NDC system has no impact on economic growth.
Second, we consider the aging process, not through decreased fertility as is usual, but through increased longevity. This has important consequences.
Indeed, as shown by Cipriani (2013) , for given contribution rates, in contrast to decreased fertility, increased longevity unambiguously yields lower pension bene…ts. In addition, as increased longevity raises the value of investments that pay over time, it generates stronger incentives for people to invest in their education, as is well documented in the literature 4 . Therefore, social security interacts with longevity in determining the individual investment in education. We then show that increased longevity may raise the size of the conventional retirement system rate that maximizes economic growth. This result suggests that the optimal adjustment to aging could consist in increasing the size of existing retirement systems rather than switching to notional systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic assumptions related to the age-earnings pro…les and the calculation of pension bene…ts.
In section 3, we analyze optimal behaviors of individuals and …rms in light of the basic assumptions. We assume in particular that individuals di¤er in their learning abilities, as in Docquier and Paddison (2003) and Le Garrec (2012) . In section 4, we specify the equilibrium features with actuarially fair retirement systems. In section 5, we then show that actuarially fair retirement systems, depending on their size and on the calculation of pension bene…ts, can enhance economic growth. In section 6, we then specify optimal adjustments for economic growth when longevity increases. The last section provides a brief conclusion.
Earnings pro…le and pension bene…ts: basic assumptions
The model used here is an extended version of the Ben-Porath model (1967) with uncertain lifetimes. Individuals live for either two or three periods:
they are respectively young, adult, and old. Survival is complete through adulthood. Each adult has a probability 2 (0; 1) to survive to old age.
The size of the young generation is normalized to one at each date. Due to complete survivance, the size of the adult generation is also equal to one at each date, whereas the size of the retired generation is equal to . Aging then occurs in the model through increased longevity.
Human capital and age-earnings pro…les
When young, individuals go to school. During this period, which corresponds to primary and secondary education (compulsory schooling), individuals born in t 1 learn basic knowledge represented by the average knowledge Z t 1 of the contemporary working generation. In addition, they can choose to make an e¤ort e t 1 in learning (where e t 1 = 0 or 1) to pass the …nal secondary school examination, qualifying for university entrance. In the second period, those who have made the e¤ort can then complement their basic knowledge by pursuing training during a period h t instead of directly entering the labor market 5 . At the end of their complementary training, their human capital is characterized by:
where denotes the return to complementary training in terms of human capital.
Skilled workers, those who have completed their training before entering the labor market, are thus characterized by a …rst period h t with no earnings.
Afterwards, they earn Z s t w t , where w t is the wage rate per unit of e¤ective labor. Earnings of skilled workers W s t over their whole active period are thus:
and are then characterized by a steep pro…le. By contrast, unskilled workers are characterized by the basic human capital during all their working period:
and are then characterized by ‡at age-earnings pro…les: 5 In that case training is a full-time activity that can be assimilated to higher education.
We could have assumed alternatively that training is a part-time activity without changing the qualitative results (see Le Garrec, 2005) .
From eqs. (1)- (4), making sure that skilled workers earn more than unskilled workers during their whole active period requires that:
In a simple way, the economy is then characterized in line with Lilliard 
Pension bene…ts
In conventional systems, the calculation of pension bene…ts is speci…c to each country, and sometimes can be very complex. In the theoretical literature on social security 6 , two di¤erent pension parts are generally distinguished: a redistributive part (the Beveridgean part) characterized by a basic ‡at-rate bene…t, and an insurance part (the Bismarckian part) characterized by earnings-related bene…ts. The latter is not generally proportional to all contributions, in which case it is not based on full lifetime average earnings (see OECD, 2007) . This is particularly the case in Greece and Spain where bene…ts are linked only to …nal salary. This also used to be the case in Sweden before the 1994 legislation introducing NDC systems. In France, before the Balladur reform of 1993, earnings-related bene…ts were linked to the ten best years, and then after the reform were gradually switched to the 25 best years. In the United States, the 35 best years are considered to calculate the bene…ts, and in Norway the best 20.
Let us de…neW i t , i = s; u, as the representative earnings on which bene…ts are based in a conventional system. It does not matter which period is used to calculate the unskilled representative earnings because the age-earnings pro…le is consistently ‡at. It follows that:
For the skilled workers, as the reference earningsW s t corresponds to the best or last years, this is speci…ed as:
Assuming that the basic ‡at-rate bene…t p t+1 is linked to the contemporary wage of unskilled workers 7 , the calculation of pension bene…ts for any worker in t in a conventional system is then given by:
where t+1 represents the size of the ‡at-rate component of the pension bene…ts and t+1 the size of the earnings-related component.
As noted in the introduction, most conventional retirement systems in the industrialized economies are close to actuarial fairness. In terms of the retirement system's implicit return, i.e. the ratio between the expected pension bene…ts of an individual and the amount of his contributions, this means that: 7 It is designed to ensure that pensioners achieve some minimum standard of living.
where denotes the public pension system contribution rate, and p i t denotes the pension bene…ts in t of a worker of type i in t 1, i = u; s 8 . If
, then the retirement system is …scally favorable to lowincome earners. In this case the system is progressive. In the opposite case,
, it is regressive.
Consider alternatively an NDC system. In that case, individual contributions are noted on individual accounts which are credited with a factor of return . By de…nition, such a pure contributory system whose pensions are calculated proportionally to all contributions is actuarially fair. Explicitly adjusted to life expectancy, pension bene…ts are then as follows:
For convenience, we will further note the calculation of pension bene…ts as:
where = 1 for a conventional system, = 0 for an NDC system. 8 If we had considered socioeconomic inequalities in mortality, actuarial fairness would have been de…ned as
, where
3 Optimal behaviors
Individuals
As speci…ed in the previous section, individuals live for three periods. They invest in education in the …rst and possibly in the second period, work in the second one and retire in the third one with probability . The preferences of an individual of type x born in t 1 are described by the following utility function:
where c t and d t+1 denote, respectively, his consumption when an adult and when old 9 , and 1 denotes the subjective discount factor. The utility from uncertain lifetime consumption is based on Yaari (1965) , as in Abel (1985) and in of learning ability through the population, and we assume it is of class C 2 .
During the second life period, individuals consume a part of their disposable income, and save via a perfect annuity market such as:
where s t denotes private savings.
In the third life period, old-age survivors are retired. They get back their savings with interest, receive their pension from the public retirement system and consume their wealth. The budget constraint is then:
where R t+1 denotes the real interest factor. Note that, with a perfect annuity market, old-age survivors share the savings of deceased individuals. The expected return to savings is then equal to the actuarially fair factor 
be the expected lifetime income of a worker of type i, i = u; s. Considering the calculation of pension bene…ts (11) , an individual who has chosen to make the e¤ort at school will maximize his lifetime income by spending the following time in training during his second life period:
sistence is based on the inheritability of learning ability within families. Supporting such a view, education is a major contributor to intergenerational earnings mobility and educational di¤erences tend to persist across generations (d 'Addio, 2007) . Nevertheless, as
shown by Bowles and Gintis (2002) , this does not imply that the intergenerational earnings determination is based only on genetic transmission. Learning ability also re ‡ects non-cognitive personality traits such as, for example, a taste for learning at school which can be in ‡uenced by the family background as much as by the genes.
where h 0 = 1+ is the training length with no retirement system.
Proposition 1 Linking pension bene…ts to the partial earnings history gen-
erates an incentive to be trained longer.
Conventional retirement systems whose pension bene…ts are based, even partially, on the best or last years generate an incentive for longer training.
Initially, the lengthening of training has a negative e¤ect on income, as during this period individuals have no earnings capacity. However, they earn more afterwards. In addition, as pensions are linked to the best or last years, individuals also bene…t, all things being equal, from an increase in their bene…ts. Following equation (15), individuals who undertake training may …nd it pro…table to be trained longer, since this represents an investment in their pension bene…ts. Note that this incentive disappears completely if pension bene…ts are based on full lifetime average earnings ( = 0), or if the system is totally ‡at-rate ( t+1 = 0). Moreover, this incentive is weaker as the interest rate increases. Indeed, the higher the interest rate, the lower the present actuarial value of pension bene…ts.
To summarize, the incentive to be trained longer generated by conventional retirement systems is due to the interaction of two factors:
pension bene…ts are linked to the best or last years training results in steeper age-earnings pro…les
The utility maximization of an individual subject to budgetary constraints (13) and (14) leads to the following savings function:
By reducing simultaneously the disposable income and the need for future income, a retirement system reduces private savings. This result holds irrespective of the calculation of pension bene…ts and their …nancing.
Last, an individual will choose to make the e¤ort at school if the opportunity of complementary training yields a monetary bene…t higher than the utility cost associated with the e¤ort, i.e. if (1 + ) ln s t x e t 1 (1 + ) ln u t . Considering an interior solution, the proportion of individuals q t who choose to be trained in t (and then to make the school e¤ort in t 1) and become skilled workers is de…ned by:
where
represents the lifetime income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in t. Following (17), the higher this inequality, the larger the proportion of individuals induced to be trained:
Firms
We consider a competitive sector characterized by a representative …rm producing a good, which can be either consumed or invested, according to a
Cobb-Douglas technology with constant return to scale:
where Y t denotes the output, K t the physical capital stock, L i t the number of workers of type i in t, i = u; s, and A the total factor productivity. Assuming for simplicity as in Docquier and Paddison (2003) and Le Garrec (2012) that skilled and unskilled labors are perfect substitutes 11 ,
Kt Ht
and assuming a total capital depreciation, the optimal conditions resulting from the maximization of the pro…t are:
Before studying the impact of retirement systems and the calculation of pension bene…ts on economic growth, we need to characterize the equilibrium and its properties.
Equilibrium
The economy is composed of four markets corresponding to the unskilled labor, the skilled labor, the physical capital and the good. In a closedeconomy setting, the general equilibrium can be obtained by considering only the clearing of three markets, as according to the Walras law, the fourth is necessarily cleared. In our case, we consider the clearing of the following markets:
unskilled labor: 11 Assuming alternatively that they are imperfect substitutes would a¤ect the skill choice by introducing a wage premium for human capital. However, it would not change the training length as de…ned in eq. (15) at all. The incentive to be trained longer as speci…ed in Proposition 1 would then not be a¤ected.
skilled labor:
physical capital:
PAYG social security and capital accumulation
Retirement systems have PAYG features, i.e. within a period, pension bene…ts are …nanced by contributions of workers of the same period. In other words, retirement systems transfer workers'income towards pensioners. Since workers are either skilled or unskilled, the social security balanced budget is de…ned as follows:
Since at date t there is a proportion q t and 1 q t of respectively skilled and unskilled workers as speci…ed in eqs. (21) and (22), the balanced budget of the retirement system (24), with eqs. (1)- (11), is rewritten as:
or:
Considering the social security balanced budget, either eq. (25) for a conventional system or eq. (26) for an NDC system, and the clearing of the physical capital market (23), with eqs. (1)- (11), (16), (19) and (20), the dynamics of capital accumulation in the model can be expressed independently of the calculation of pension bene…ts as:
As retirement systems reduce private savings (eq. 16), all things being equal, PAYG retirement systems are harmful for the accumulation of physical capital:
). In addition, as q and h are both forward-looking variables, their speci…cation is crucial to determine the dynamic properties of the model and the convergence towards its steady-state (balanced growth) path.
Human capital and actuarial fairness
As is obvious, an NDC system ( = 0) is actuarially fair. As noted in the introduction and characterized by eq. (9), most conventional retirement systems in the industrial world are also close to actuarial fairness.
Proposition 2 Conventional retirement systems whose pensions are linked to the best or last years are actuarially fair if they include a ‡at-rate component indexed on the unskilled earnings,
If t > e t , the retirement system is …scally favorable to low-income earners, , and is then progressive. In the opposite case, t < e t , it is regressive. This feature is easily understandable. On the one hand, the ‡at-rate part of the pension bene…ts is clearly favorable to low-income earners: they receive as much as high-income earners whereas they have contributed less. A ‡at-rate system is obviously progressive. On the other hand, the pension part that is linked to the best or last years, characterized by t , is favorable to high-income earners as they have a steeper lifetime income pro…le, as explained by Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Bozio and Piketty (2008) . If there is no ‡at-rate part then the system is regressive. Therefore, there is a unique combination of the ‡at-rate and earning-related parts, the one de…ned in Proposition 2, that characterizes actuarial fairness in a conventional system.
Consider an actuarially fair retirement system, i.e. either = 0 or = 1 and t+1 = e t+1 . In such a case, the lifetime income inequality I t = s t u t becomes I t = 
In this con…guration, the choice for a young individual to make the effort at school in t 1 to become a skilled worker in t depends only on their personal talent, life expectancy and the length of the training anticipated.
As h 0 corresponds to max (1 h) Bh , we can deduce from eq. (28) that any increase in the training length compared to the basic level h 0 will lead to a decrease in the proportion of skilled workers: . Using eqs. (19)- (20) and (25)- (27) yields
. Thus, the training length according to the social security features can be summarized as:
If = 1 and t+1 = e t+1 , we derive from (29) RHS < h 0 . In this case, the training is expressed as a function
In the case of an NDC system, as the latter has no impact on the training length, we will note conveniently h t = h ( ; ), where = 0, i.e. h (0; ) = h 0 = 1+ 8 . Thereafter, as the skill choice depends only on the training length and on the longevity (eq. 28), it can also be expressed as q t = q ( ; ) = Q (h ( ; ) ; ), where = 1 or = 0. In the latter case, q t = Q (h (0; ) ; ) = Q (h 0 ; ) corresponds to an unchanged proportion of skilled workers in t compared to a situation with no retirement system:
Dynamic properties
As underlined by eqs. (28) and (29), human capital variables are in their steady-state values independently of the calculation of pension bene…ts. Accordingly, considering an actuarially fair retirement system, the physical capital accumulation dynamics (27) can be rewritten as:
Since < 1, given k 0 > 0, the model has good dynamic properties and converges to its steady-state (balanced growth) path characterized by h =
As the convergence is veri…ed, the impact of retirement systems and the calculation of pension bene…ts on investment in human capital and on growth can now be discussed.
Social security and economic growth
On the balanced growth path, we deduce from the labor market clearing relations (21) and (22) as well as eqs. (1), (3) and (18) the economic growth rate g:
In line with the new growth literature initiated by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990) , equation (31) 
NDC systems
A pure contributory NDC system ( = 0) has no impact on the training length (eq. 17). As a consequence, as underlined in equation (28), it also has no impact on the proportion of skilled workers. Indeed, in that case, as pension bene…ts are proportional to all contributions the retirement system can no longer alter the skill choice. NDC systems are then characterized by an unchanged investment in human capital, i.e. h = h 0 and q = Q (h 0 ; ), and it follows that:
Proposition 3 NDC systems have no impact on economic growth.
Conventional systems
Consider alternatively conventional systems whose pensions are linked to the best or last years, i.e. = 1. Admitting that they are actuarially fair, i.e. = e , following eq. (29) However, when the size of the system increases, everything else being equal, the leading e¤ect can be reversed if lifetime income inequality strongly matters in the skill choice, or more formally if "
, where " 1 Q (h 0 ; ) > 0 with an NDC system (or with no retirement system). This stresses the importance of evaluating the impact of aging on economic growth and the size of the conventional system that maximizes growth so as to determine the desirable adjustment.
6 Aging and optimal growth 6.1 Longevity, education and growth
As noted in the introduction, the coming century will be characterized by First, individuals will need to …nance a longer period in retirement. With low pension bene…ts, they will inevitably need to save more before retirement.
As increased longevity raises the value of investments that pay over time, it will also encourage investment in education. For an economy with high life expectancy, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) have hence estimated the elasticity of schooling years with respect to life expectancy at 0:7. Assuming that economic growth is driven by investment in education, we can also expect that increased longevity will have a positive impact on economic growth.
Proposition 5 With no retirement system (or with an NDC system), in-creased longevity stimulates economic growth by increasing the proportion of skilled workers while leaving unchanged the time they have spent in training.
This result is directly related to Proposition 1. Indeed, if there is no retirement system or an NDC system, the training length is h = h 0 = 1+ .
In that case, there is then no impact of aging on the length of training. The impact comes only from a change in the proportion of skilled workers such that, following eq. (28),
By contrast, in the case of an actuarially fair conventional system ( = 1 and = e ) it follows from eq. (29) that the training length increases with longevity: 
Proposition 6
With an actuarially fair retirement system whose pensions are linked to the best or last years, increased longevity enhances economic growth by increasing both the proportion of skilled workers and the time they have spent to be trained if the latter is moderate enough.
Formally, the condition in Proposition 6 applies as long as
As lim = 0, this is always the case so long as the size of the retirement system is su¢ ciently low. 13 Note that Bh 1 = 1
Optimal growth
An important distinction must be made between the two systems when considering aging. As an NDC system has no impact on economic growth, no adjustment is required when the population is aging. By contrast, if a conventional system can enhance economic growth, it can also be potentially harmful if its size is too high compared to the optimal size. We must then study the evolution of the latter to verify, at a minimum, that an unchanged size does not become harmful for economic growth, i.e. that the optimal size is not decreasing with longevity. Assuming = arg max f1 + gg < 1, it follows from Proposition 4 that:
On the one hand, assuming d 2 G (:) 0 8 0 yields function is, in absolute value, higher than unity: " dG 1.
Proposition 7 Assuming = arg max f1 + gg < 1, if the length of training is weakly related to longevity, " dG 1 is a su¢ cient condition so that a marginal increase in longevity raises the growth-maximizing size of a conventional retirement system.
Note that the condition " dG 1 in Proposition 7 is not restrictive.
Let us consider for example a Pareto distribution. In that case, the density function dG ( ) = is low enough, the superiority of a conventional system over an NDC system may be preserved, i.e. g ( 1 ;^ ( 1 )) > g ( 1 ; = 0). In that case, a switch towards NDC systems will not be optimal. By contrast, if
is high enough, we may observe the reverse, i.e. g Note that all the solutions above have been considered while keeping the calculation of pension bene…ts actuarially fair. However, if the main problem of existing retirement systems is that they are too large, another solution would be to increase the progressivity of the system. Indeed, as highlighted by Koethenbuerger (2007) , the size of the retirement system chosen by the median voter tends to decrease as the link between contributions and bene…ts is loosened. It is a fact that progressive systems appear smaller than actuarially fair systems. However, as argued by Le Garrec (2005), more progressivity also leads to fewer incentives for people to invest in their education. At this stage, the impact on economic growth of introducing more progressivity would then appear uncertain, unless it also strengthens majority support for public education funding, as argued by Kaganovich and Meier (2012) . It would be very important for future research to investigate whether these incentives on public education could compensate the loss in private education incentives so that introducing progressivity may be a credible alternative to switching to NDC systems in certain circumstances. To do that, it is necessary to introduce public education explicitly into the model.
Conclusion
Life expectancy at birth in Western Europe, which is currently 80 years, Based on the claim that the PAYG retirement systems are generally ine¢ cient (accused of low returns and of distorting individual behavior), some economists such as Feldstein (1995a Feldstein ( , 1995b Feldstein ( , 1996 stress that these …nancial di¢ culties are providing an opportunity to move to fully funded systems. In many respects, introducing an NDC system largely involves moving from a de…ned bene…t to a de…ned contribution system while aiming to stabilize the contribution rate, an objective that can be achieved similarly within the scope of more conventional de…ned bene…t systems. As emphasized by Börsch-Supan (2006), cleverly designed conventional retirement systems can often do the same job as NDC systems. As shown in this article, they can even do better.
In particular, as most conventional retirement systems link pension bene…ts only to the partial earnings history, they can stimulate economic growth by promoting the accumulation of human capital, at least if their size is not too high. When population aging is taken into account, the optimal adjustment in terms of economic growth is then likely to be an increase in the size of the existing retirement systems rather than a switch to notional systems. This recommendation appears strengthened by the further observation that actuarially fair retirement systems whose pensions are linked to the best or last years lower lifetime income inequality, whereas NDC systems do not.
More generally, moving to an NDC system, by nature purely contributory, de…nitively closes the debate about the progressivity of the retirement system, which is an important one in a democracy. According to Le Garrec (2012), compared to any actuarially fair system, greater progressivity would result in negative incentive e¤ects that would lead to less economic growth, but also to less lifetime inequality. In that case, it would then be interesting to evaluate with an intertemporal social welfare, as used in Boadway et al. proposition 7
Assuming that " , this is in particular the case if is su¢ ciently low.
